BKENPTSC.RVW   20070506

"Endpoint Security", Mark S. Kadrich, 2007, 0-321-43695-4,
U$54.99/C$68.99
%A   Mark S. Kadrich
%C   P.O. Box 520, 26 Prince Andrew Place, Don Mills, Ontario  M3C 2T8
%D   2007
%G   0-321-43695-4 978-0-321-43695-5
%I   Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
%O   U$54.99/C$68.99 416-447-5101 800-822-6339 bkexpress@aw.com
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0321436954/robsladesinterne
  http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0321436954/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0321436954/robsladesin03-20
%O   Audience i- Tech 1 Writing 1 (see revfaq.htm for explanation)
%P   348 p.
%T   "Endpoint Security"

"This book is different because it uses a basic tenant of science to
understand what the problem is and how to manage it."  That sentence,
from the preface, is indicative of the contents of the book on two
counts.  First, the sentence demonstrates a lack of care in writing
and in proofing: science doesn't have "tenants" (although it does have
tenets).  Second, the author does not explain what endpoint security
is (and doesn't get around to telling us what scientific tenet could
be used to understand and manage it).

Chapter one is supposed to define endpoints for us, but it seems to
indicate that they can be any device at all.  (There is also an
extremely confusing analogy to ventilation systems, and a statement
that endpoints are the new "perimeter.")  Security fails, the author
tells us in chapter two, because of vendors and malware.  (There is,
in addition, another odd mention of science.)  Among other things, in
chapter three he asserts that we don't understand why security fails,
and then goes on to promote process/control modelling.  Chapter four
is used to point out that the endpoint is the place to secure the
overall system, but the reasoning behind this statement is not clear. 
(Kadrich raises an interesting idea about security based upon
assessment of trust, rather than risk, but the notion is not
developed.)  Integration of endpoint protection into protection of the
net appears to be discussed in chapter five, but the suggestions are
extremely complex.  Although the author does not use the term, the
idea behind chapter six is that of the trusted computing base, in this
case applied to software systems and development.  Chapter seven
starts with some examination of change detection, but ends by saying
that instant messaging and peer-to-peer file sharing programs are
dangerous.  Some tips for securing or hardening Microsoft Windows are
provided in chapter eight.  The advice is generally sound, but hardly
complete.  Similar information is given for Apple's OS X in chapter
nine, and Linux in ten.  More limited content on mobile devices is in
chapter eleven, and on other devices in twelve.  Chapter thirteen
finishes off the volume with "case studies" which prove (as if any
proof were needed) that endpoint devices can be attacked.

There are some potentially valuable issues (such as the need for
engineering rigour in designing systems, and the merit of formal
processes) raised in this book, but they are not presented in a
helpful manner.  Kadrich's writing style is long on catchy section
titles, and short on clear explanation.  Topics seem to be raised, and
abandoned, at random, with very little structure being followed.

I can sympathize with the position that we need to take more care with
individual devices, rather than concentrating solely on guarding the
"system" or the "network."  However, this book provides very little
that will be of use to those who are trying to implement overall
security.  For those trying to harden specific systems, there is
better information for Windows in Thomas Greene's "Computer Security
for the Home and Small Office" (cf. BKCMSCHO.RVW) or, ironically,
Bove's "Just Say No to Microsoft" (cf. BKJSN2MS.RVW).  For UNIX and
its cousins there is "Practical UNIX and Internet Security" (cf.
BKPRUISC.RVW) or the "Linux Security Cookbook" (cf. BKLNSCCB.RVW).  We
can even get some advice for mobile devices from "Symbian OS Platform
Security" (cf. BKSYOSPS.RVW).

copyright Robert M. Slade, 2007   BKENPTSC.RVW   20070506